Bet,veen these three special cases--establishment, independence, and disestablishment-there will be intermediate cases: partial support .(when y entails part of the content of x); for example, if our contingent y follows from x but not vice versa, then it is itself part of the content of x and thus entails part of the content of x, supporting x; and partial undermining of x by y (when y partially supports x); for example, ify follo\\~s fronl x. We shall say, then, that y supports x, or undermines x, whenever P(xy) or P(Xy), respectively, exceed their values for independence. (The three cases-support, 00dernuning, independence -are easily seen to be exhaustive and exclusive on this definition.) 4. Consider now the conjecture that there are three statements, Xl' X2' and y, such that (i) Xl and X2 are each independent of y (or undermined by y) while (ii) y supports their conjunction X1X2.
Obviously, we should have to say in such a case that y confIrms XIX2 to a higher degree than it confirms either Xl or X2; in symbols, C(xl , y) < C(XIX" y) > C(X2' y) (4. 1 ) But this would be incompatible with the view that C(x, y) is a probability, i.e. with C(x, y) = P(x, y) (4.2 ) since for probabilities we have the generally valid formula P(x l , y) > P(X I X 2 , y) < P(X2' y) (4.3) which, in the presence of (4.1) contradicts (4.2). Thus we should have to drop (4.2). But in view of 0 < P(x, y) :< I, (4.3) is an immediate consequence of the general multiplication principle for probabilities. Thus ,ve should have to discard such a principle for the degree of confirmation. Moreover, it appears that we should have to drop the special addition principle also. For a consequence of this principle is, since P(x, y) > 0, \ P(X I X 2 or X I X2, y) > P(X 1 X2' y) .
(4.4) But for C(x, y), this could not remain valid, considering that the alternative, X1X2 or X t X2, is equivalent to Xl' so that we obtain by substitution on the left-hand side of (4. I) :
C(X I X2 or X I X2, y) < C(X I X 2 , y) (4.5) In the presence of (4.4), (4.5) contradicts (4.2 7· Why have C(x, y) and P(x, y) been confounded so persistently? Why has it been ignored that it is absurd to say that some evidence y of which x is completely independent can yet strongly 'confirm' X ?
And that y can strongly' confirln ' x, even if y undermines x? And this even ify is the total available evidence? I do not know the answer to this questioll, but some suggestions lllay be helpful. There is first the powerful tendency to think that whatever may be called the , likelihood' or ' probability' of a hypothesis 111USt be a probability in the sense of the calculus of probabilities. In order to disentangle the various issues here involved, I distinguished twenty years ago what I then called the ' degree ofconfirnlation ' fronl both, the logical and the principles is that' they are generally accepted in practically all modem theories of probabilitYl" i.e. our P(x, y) which Camap identifies with the 'degree of confirmation '. But the very term ' degree ofconfirmation ' (' Grad der Bewiihrung ') was introduced by me in sections 82 £ of my Logik der Forschsutlg (a book to which Camap sometimes refers), in order to show that both logical and statistical probability are inadequate to serve for a degree ofconfirmation, since confirmability nlust increase with testability, and thus with (absolute) logical improbability and content. (See bdow.) 1 The example satisfies (i) for i"Jepetldetlce rather than uuJern,initlg. (To obtairi one for undennining, add amber as d fifth colour, and put y == ' u is atllbcr or bluc or yello\v'.) 145 statistical probability. But Wlfortunately, the term' degree ofconfirnlation '·was soon used by others as a new name for (logical) probability; perhaps Wlder the influence of the mistaken view that science, Wlable to attain certainty, must aim at a kind of' Ersatz '-at the highest attainahle probability. Another suggestion is this. It seems that the phrase ' the degree of confirmation of x by y' was never turned rOWld into ' the degree to \\?hich y confirms x " or ' the power ofy to support x '; for in this form it would have been quite obvious that, in a case in which y supports Xl and undermines X2, C(x 1 , y) > C(X2~y) is absurd-although P(x 1 , y) > P(X2' y) may be quite in order, indicating, in such a case, that we had P(x 1 ) > P(x 2 ) to start with. Furthermore, there seenlS to be a tendency to confuse measures of increase or decrease with the measures that increase and decrease (as shown by the history of the concepts of velocity, acceleration, and force). But the power of r to support x, it will be seen, is essentially a measuI'e of the inaease or decrease due to y, in the probability of x. (See also 9 (vii), below.) 8. It will perhaps be said, in reply to all this, that it is in any case legitimate to call P(x, y) by any name, and also by the name' degree of confirmation '. But the question before us is not a verbal one.
The degree of confirmation of a hypothesis x by empirical evidence y is supposed to be used for estimating the degree to which x is backed by experience. But P(x, y) cannot serve this purpose, since P(x 1 , y) may be higher than P(X2' y) even thougll Xl is undermined by y and X 2 supported by y, and since this is due to the fact that P(x, y) depends very strongly upon P(x), i.e. the absolute probability of x, which has nothing whatever to do with the eUlpirical evidence. Furthermore, the degree of confirmation is supposed to have an influence upon the question whether we should accept, or choose, a certain hypothesis x, if only tentatively; a high degree of confirmation is supposed to characterise a hypothesis as ' good ' (or ' acceptable '), \vhile a disconfirn1ed hypothesis is supposed to be ' bad '. But P(x, y) Let x be consistent,! and P(y) =f: 0; then we defme,
P(y, x) -P(y)
E(x, y) = P{y, x) + P{y) (9.1) E(x, y) may also be interpreted as a non-additive measure of the dependence ofy upon x, or the support given to y by x (and vice versa).
It satisfies the most important ofour desiderata, but' not all: for example, it violates (viii, c) below, and satisfies (iii) and (iv) only approximately in special cases. To remedy these defects, I propose to define C(x, y) as follows.
Let x be consistent and P(y) =F 0; then we defme,
C(x, y) = E(x, Y)(I + P(x)P(x, y)) (9.2)
This is less simple than, for example, E(x, Y)(I + P(xy)), which satisfies most of our desiderata but violates (iv); while for C(x, y) the theorem holds that it satisfies all of the following desiderata :
(i) C{x, y)~0 respectively if and only if y supports x, or IS independent of x, or undermines x.
(ii) -I = C(y, y) <:
Note that C(x), and therefore C(x, x), is an additive Ineasure of the content of x, definable by P(x), i.e. the absolute probability of x, to be false, or the a priori likelihood of x to be refuted. Thus cOl1firlllability equals refutability or testability.2
(vi) Let x have a high content-so that C(x, y) approaches E(x, y)-and let y support x. (We may, for example, take y to be the total available empirical evidence.) Then for any given y, C (x, y) increases with the power ofx to explain y (i.e. to explain more and more of the content of y), and therefore with the scientific interest of x.
( E(x, y, z) is the explanatory power of x with respect to y, in the presence of z. IT WILL be remembered that Newton's theory assumed that, when a ray oflight passes into a denser medium, the perpendicular component of its incident velocity is accelerated owing to an attractive force acting perpendicularly to the refracting 'surface, and consequently the component parallel to the surface remains constant. This gives the result, in contr2diction with both the wave theory~nd Foucault's experiment of 1850 (proving that the velocity of light in water isJess than in air) that the act 1 .lal velocity will be greater in the medium of refraction. The view was expressed by the late Alexander Wood-in the course of a discussion of the role of crucial experiments in physics! -that in order to reconcile Newton's theory, it would have been sufficient to introduce the following assumption as a way Qut: namely, that when the light goes into a denser medium the perpendicular component of the incident velocity remains unchanged, while the parallel component is diminished by action of a frictional kind. This assumption would yield the consequence that the light will travel
